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PATENT PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
Mary Atkinson
Abstract: A fundamental purpose of patent law is to encourage the development
of new inventions by granting to the inventor exclusivity in the marketplace for a limited
period of time. Patent law in the area of pharmaceuticals is complicated by the
responsibility of governments not only to encourage research and development of new
drugs, but also to assure that new drugs are widely available and affordable, as well as
safe and effective. Governments, influenced by market and political philosophies, design
patent laws and drug regulatory schemes to meet these responsibilities. The United
States has a well-developed pharmaceutical industry and private-payer health care, and
thus has very strong patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Canada, on the other hand,
has a relatively small pharmaceutical industry and government-payer health care.
Canada, therefore, weakened the patent rights of pioneer drug companies by instituting
compulsory licensing and price controls on brand-name drugs. Despite these
fundamental differences, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have brought near uniformity to the patent and
regulatory schemes of both countries. Pioneer drugs have made great strides in
increasing longevity and improving quality of life. The challenge is to make these new
drugs affordable. Governments need to find creative solutions to this challenge while
maintaining strong patent protection for pharmaceuticals so as to ensure the continued
development of new medicines. Given the political and economic realities in both the
United States and Canada, each government has fulfilled its obligation to the public to
develop a reasonably balanced system of patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
1. INTRODUCTION
Canada and the United States share a common border as well as a
common-law legal heritage. However, their differing political systems and
market philosophies have led to significant differences in patent protection
for pharmaceuticals. The fundamental purpose of patent law is to encourage
invention and new discoveries by granting to the inventor exclusivity in the
market place for a limited period of time. 1 Patent protection for new
inventions in the pharmaceutical industry is complicated by competing
public interests. The public has an interest in encouraging research and
development of new medicines to increase longevity and quality of life.
However, the public also has an interest in keeping the price of new
1 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times
to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.").
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medicines low to maximize the number of persons who have access to the
drugs. Furthermore, the public has an interest in ensuring that new
medicines entering the market are both safe and effective.
These competing public interests create tension between the
pharmaceutical industry and the generic drug industry. Pharmaceutical
companies make large investments in research and development to bring
new drugs2 that are safe and effective to market. 3 New drugs are priced to
recoup these investments.4 In contrast, the generic industry does not invest
in original research and development, but instead makes copies of brand-
name drugs that are already in the market place and have been approved by a
governmental regulatory body as safe and effective. The price of a generic
drug is thus lower than the price of the equivalent brand-name drug.6
Government policy in the area of pharmaceuticals thus has three
objectives: (1) to protect the intellectual property rights of brand-name
pharmaceutical companies in an effort to encourage research and
development; (2) to foster a strong generic drug industry to contain the costs
of new drugs; and (3) to design a regulatory scheme that balances the
interests of the pharmaceutical companies and the generic drug companies,
while ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs in the market place.
This Comment examines how the Canadian and United States
governments have designed their patent laws and regulatory processes to
fulfill their obligations to the public in the area of pharmaceuticals. Part II
of this Comment examines how the United States, while maintaining its free
market system, has moved to reduce the price of drugs by allowing generic
drug companies to engage in some activities during the regulatory process
that otherwise would infringe on the exclusive rights of the patent holder.
Part III examines how Canada, with its system of socialized medicine and a
lesser commitment to free markets, adopted a system of compulsory
licensing and price controls to reduce the cost of drugs. Part IV examines
how international trade agreements have resulted in near uniformity of
patent protection for pharmaceuticals in both countries. Finally, Part V
concludes that, given the political and economic realities in both countries,
2 Sometimes referred to as "brand-name" or "pioneer drugs."
3 Drug Development-A Long and Risky Process, in PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2000, at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/publications/profleOO/execsum.phtnil.
Understanding Brand-Name and Generic Drugs, What You Need to Know, in THE CANADIAN
DRUG MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, EDUCATION & COMMUNICATIONS MATERIAL FOR EMPLOYER DRUG
PLANS, at http://www.cdma-acfpp.org/resourcecentre/drgplnqa.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
5 [d.
6 id.
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each government has fulfilled its obligation to the public to develop a
reasonably balanced system of patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
II. THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has a very strong domestic pharmaceutical
industry.7 Pharmaceutical companies in the United States make the largest
investment in research and development ("R&D") of new drugs worldwide,
conducting 36% of global R&D.8 While the United States government has
an interest in maintaining a healthy pharmaceutical industry, the government
is also concerned with providing the public with affordable drugs. The
United States has at its core a free market economy. 9 Although the United
States has used price controls in the past,' 0 Congress has chosen to control
the price of prescription drugs by encouraging price competition through a
statutory and regulatory scheme that facilitates the entry of generic drugs
into the market.7
A. Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals-The Patent Act'
2
The Patent Act governs the granting of patents in the United States:
Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the
13invention into the United States....
[W]hoever, without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent. 14
7 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their
Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of US. Law and Observations for the Future, 39
J.L. & TECH. 389, 390 (1999).
SU.S. Leadership In Drug Innovation Due To R&D, Free Market, in PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH
AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, supra note 3.
9 BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY 30 (40a ed. 1989).
10 Id. at 343-45.
1 Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US.
The Waxman-Hatch Act after One Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS, 110, 121 (Supp. 1996).
12 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-376 (2001).
35 U.S.C.S. § 154(a)(1).
14 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (2000).
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B. Regulation of Safety and Efficacy of Pharmaceuticals Prior to 1984
Patent protection for pharmaceuticals is complicated by requirements
imposed under the federal regulatory process to ensure the safety and
efficacy of drugs.
1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act' 5
In 1962, Congress enacted major changes to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, requiring drug manufacturers to submit "substantial
evidence" that their drugs were both safe and effective.' 6 To implement this
requirement, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") set up a lengthy
approval process for new drugs, including clinical trials. 17 These new
regulations significantly shortened the effective patent term for pioneer
drugs because the drugs are not in the commercial market during the
regulatory process.18
2. Infringement by Generic Companies during the Regulatory Process
FDA regulations also required generic drug manufacturers to comply
with its regulatory process without relying on data submitted by the pioneer
drug manufacturer to prove safety and efficacy.' 9 Generic manufacturers
thus had to perform many of their own tests. Since it is an act of
infringement to manufacture or use a patented product during the term of the
20patent, generic manufacturers could not begin testing until after the patent
term expired. As a result, the entry of generic drugs into the market was
often delayed for several years after the brand-name drug's patent expired.2'
These regulations gave pioneer drugs a defacto patent term extension.
" 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301-95 (1997).16 Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 215, 220 (1999).
" Id. See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 355.
18 Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 11, at 118. Drug manufacturers apply for patents before
entering the FDA regulatory process because once information about the drug is in the public domain, the
inventor only has one year to file for a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). If the inventor does not file for
patentgprotection within one year, the statute bars the issuance of a patent to the inventor. Id.
Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 11, at 111.20 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (2000).
2' Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 11, at 111 n. 1.
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In the landmark case, Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., 22 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that a generic
drug manufacturer commits infringement'by using the active ingredient of a
patented drug to perform pre-market entry tests mandated by the FDA before
the patent term of the pioneer drug expires. In that case, generic
manufacturer Bolar Pharmaceutical imported the active ingredient of a
Roche Products drug and manufactured a generic version of the drug before
the Roche patent had expired.23 Bolar had begun the regulatory process
during the patent term in preparation for market entry when Roche's patent
expired.24
The court rejected Bolar's argument that its use fell under the
experimental use defense,2" ruling that although Bolar's use may have been
experimental, its ultimate purpose was commercial and therefore infringed
Roche's patent rights. 26 The court also refused Bolar's request to create a
new exception to the use prohibition. 27  The court decided to leave it to
Congress to resolve the conflicting policies between the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Patent Act.
28
C. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
("Waxman-Hatch ") Act of 198429
In 1984, Congress attempted to resolve the conflict between the Patent
Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with passage of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration ("Waxman-Hatch") Act.30 The
Act was a compromise between the interest of generic manufacturers
obtaining faster entry into the market, and the interest of brand-name
22 733 F.2d 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937 (1984).
23 Id. at 860.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 863. Experimental use defense is an affirmative defense to patent infringement, under which
manufacture or use of a patented device for experimentation only, and not for sale or profit, does not
constitute infringement. See, e.g., Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813);
Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896).
26 Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 863.
27 Id. at 863-64. Bolar argued that the public should benefit from price competition as soon as a
patent expires, and that a generic drug should not be delayed in coming to market because of conflicts
between the Patent Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.
28 Id. at 865.
29 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1997); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271, 282 (2000)).
30 Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 11, at 110.
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pharmaceutical companies in regaining patent term lost during the regulatory
process.31
Title I of the Act established an abbreviated new drug application
("ANDA") approval process for generic drugs, eliminating the requirement
for independent proof that the generic version of a pioneer drug is safe and
effective.32 Under the ANDA, the safety and efficacy of the generic drug is
accepted if the manufacturer certifies generally that the generic drug has the
same active ingredient(s) as the pioneer drug; that the route of
administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the generic drug is the
same as the pioneer drug; and that the generic drug is the bioequivalent of
the pioneer drug.33
Title II of the Act also provided some relief for the manufacturers of
brand-name pharmaceuticals by restoring a portion of the patent term lost
while a pioneer drug is in the regulatory process. 34 It also requires the
generic manufacturer to certify that no patent exists on the pioneer drug; or
if there is a patent, that the patent has expired or will expire, or that the
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the actions of the generic
manufacturer. 35 If there is no patent, or the patent has expired, the generic
drug may enter into the market immediately upon the granting of FDA
approval.36 If there is a patent in force, the generic drug may not enter the
market--even if it has received FDA approval-until the expiration of the
patent.37 If the generic manufacturer certifies that a patent is invalid or will
not be infringed, the holder of the patent has forty-five days after receiving
notice to bring an infringement suit.38 If a suit is brought, approval of the
application will be withheld for thirty months, or until a court decision is
rendered or the patent at issue expires.39
In addition, the Act overruled the federal court's decision in Roche v.
Bolar 40 by providing a safe harbor provision for generic manufacturers
against charges of infringement:
31 Id.
32 Id. at 110-11.
33 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii-iv) (1997).
34 Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 11, at 118. See also 35 U.S.C.S. § 156.
3' 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
36 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
'7 Id. § 355j)(5)(B)(i-ii).
'8 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
39 Id.
Q Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937
(1984). See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the United States or import into the United States
a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
4 1
1. Litigation of the Waxman-Hatch Safe Harbor Provision
The courts of the United States have been called upon to determine
what types of activities are "solely for uses reasonably related to"
developing information to comply with a federal regulatory process, and
thus qualify for the safe harbor protection. In Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. ,42 the court interpreted the language of the
statute literally, finding that infringing uses that were not solely for meeting
FDA requirements would not be afforded a defense under 35 U.S.C. §
271 (e)( 1).43 Genentech had manufactured a generic version of a Scripps
patented human blood product and entered into a research and development
agreement with another party to develop a method for commercial-scale
manufacture of the generic product and to produce bioequivalency data
required by the FDA.44 Genentech also filed for a European patent on its
product.45 The court ruled that Congress intended the exemption to be
narrow. Thus, even though some of the uses of the product were reasonably
related to obtaining FDA approval, since the uses served multiple purposes
they were beyond the protection of the safe harbor.46
In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,4 7 however, the court took a
broader view and undertook an extensive analysis of the statute to determine
the standard for deciding whether or not an activity by a generic
manufacturer was entitled to the benefit of the safe harbor under §
271(e)(1). 48 The court stated, "Congress clearly decided that it wanted
potential competitors to be able to ready themselves, fully, during the life of
the patent, to enter the commercial marketplace in a large scale way as soon
as the relevant patents expired. ' 49
41 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
42 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
43 Id. at 1396. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
4 Id. at 1384.
41 Id. at 1384-85.
46 Id. at 1396.
47 755 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
48 Id. at 1276-80.
49 Id. at 1277.
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The Intermedics court determined that only those acts of manufacture,
use, and sale, which would be acts of infringement except for the safe
harbor, were required to be "solely for uses reasonably related to" meeting
FDA requirements.5° In other words, acts that were non-infringing were
allowed purposes. 51 The court ruled, therefore, that use of clinical data for
the purpose of raising capital was a non-infringing use. 2 The Intermedics
court also determined that Congress intended the inquiry to be objective, not
subjective; that is, the court should "focus on conduct ('uses ') that actually
has occurred (as opposed to uses to which a party might put its product in
the future) and that would constitute infringement but for the exemption.-53
Based on these principles, a "use" that has a commercial or business
purpose, in addition to meeting FDA requirements, will not lose the benefit
of the safe harbor.
54
The alleged infringing activities at issue in Intermedics involved the
manufacture and sale of a medical device by Ventritex to institutions and
clinicians, both domestic and foreign, for the purpose of conducting clinical
trials and generating data for submission to the FDA.55 The court found that
these uses fell within the safe harbor, especially in light of the fact that the
clinical data had only been submitted to the FDA and had not been
submitted to any foreign regulatory agency. 6 The court also found that the
demonstration of the device at trade shows was not an infringing activity
because Ventritex had clearly indicated at the trade shows that the product
was not for general commercial sale. 7
Subsequent courts have generally followed the reasoning in
Intermedics. For example, Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,58
the Federal Circuit59 ruled that presenting clinical trial data at conferences
and using the data for fund-raising purposes did not constitute infringing
activity under the statute. The Teletronics court noted that Congress must
have been aware of the need for generic manufacturers to raise capital and
50 Id.
S Id.
52 Id. at 1281 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that infringing acts only involve the "actual making, using, or selling of the patented invention")).
" 755 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
'4 Id. at 1279.
" Id. at 1282.
56 Id. at 1284.
17 Id. at 1286.
"8 982 F.2d 1520, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (1992).
59 The Federal Circuit has national appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases, subject only to
Supreme Court review. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 25 (1998).
60 TeletronicsPacingSys., 982 F.2d at 1524.
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therefore Congress did not intend to prevent the use of clinical trial data for
business purposes.
6 1
Although the Ventritex cases involved medical devices and not drugs,
the reasoning in Intermedics is applicable to pharmaceuticals 62 and was used
by the court in NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.63 The NeoRx court
found the production of large commercial-scale quantities of a drug to be
exempt under § 271(e)(1) because the FDA requires proof of commercial-
scale manufacturing capacity.64 The court also found that conducting
clinical trials overseas, with an ultimate goal of obtaining foreign regulatory
approval, was an exempt activity. 65 The court accepted Immunomedics'
argument that the purpose of the trials was to obtain information for their
FDA filings and found that a "commercial motivation does not necessarily
deprive defendant of the section 271(e)(1) exemption. ', 66 However, the
NeoRx court did not exempt the shipping by Immunomedics of product
samples to foreign regulatory agencies. 7 This act was infringing because it
involved shipping of the patented invention and not just use of clinical data.
The infringing act was not exempt under § 271(e)(1) because the purpose
"was not reasonably related to the submission of data to the FDA.",68
Similarly, in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,69 the stockpiling of product
in preparation for market entry was found to be a non-exempt infringing
activity. 70 The court, citing Scripps and NeoRx, also found the shipping of
product to foreign regulatory agencies to be a non-exempt infringing
activity.
7
'
As the above cases suggest, commercial activity involving
manufacture or use of the patented invention is an infringement. However,
use of data relating to the patented invention, even if the use is for
commercial purposes in addition to meeting FDA requirements, is allowed.
61 Id. at 1525.
62 The Supreme Court has ruled that § 271(e)(1) applies to medical devices as well as drugs. Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
63 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
64 Id. at 206.
65 Id. at 207.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996).
70 Id. at 397.71 Id. at 3 97 n. 1.
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2. The Waxman-Hatch Act Achieved a Reasonable Balance
The Waxman-Hatch Act and subsequent court interpretations limiting
acts of infringement only to those involving the patented invention have
achieved a reasonably balanced system of protection for pharmaceutical
inventions. Pioneer drug manufacturers received restoration of patent term,
while the generic drug manufacturers achieved faster entry into the market,
as well as permission to engage in the marketing and fund raising which
enables them to be competitive as soon as the patent expires. The public
also benefits because pioneer companies continue to have incentives to
invest in research and development, and generic manufacturers can bring
less expensive drugs to market sooner.
III. THE LAW IN CANADA
Canada has a system of nationalized medicine in which the
government is directly involved in providing health care for all its citizens.72
The government thus has a vested interest in keeping drug prices low.
Therefore, although Canada provides patent protection for pharmaceuticals,
the government weakened the rights of the patentee by instituting a
compulsory licensing system.7 3 When the government eventually abolished
compulsory licensing, it instituted price controls.74
A. Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals
1. The Patent Act
75
Patent protection in Canada is governed by the Patent Act, which
provides that "[e]very patent granted under this Act shall . . . grant to the
patentee... the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing
and using the invention and selling it to others to be used.,
7 6
72 Aslam H. Anis, Pharmaceutical Policies in Canada: Another Example of Federal-Provincial
Discord, 162(4) CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 523 (2000), http://gateway2.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi.
73 Joel Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy
and Politics, 40 HEALTH POLICY 69, 70 (1997).
74 Id. at 73.
7' R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 1-103 (2001) (Can.).
76 R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 42.
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2. Compulsory Licensing
Whereas the United States did not limit the rights of pharmaceutical
patent holders until the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984, Canada began limiting
the exclusive rights of pharmaceutical patentees as early as 1923, when
parliament amended the Patent Act to provide for compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals. Under the amendment, a party could apply to the
Commissioner of Patents for a license to manufacture and market a patented
drug before the term of the patent expired.78 The compulsory nature of the
license meant that the patent owner could not prevent the Commissioner
from granting the license.79 In exchange for giving up the exclusivity of the
patent, the patent owner received a small royalty fee.
80
The idea behind the amendment was to contain the cost of drugs
through competitive market forces by providing multiple sources for the
patented drug.81 The goal of the amendment was not realized, however, as
only twenty-two licenses were granted between 1923 and 1969.82 One of the
main reasons for the failure of the policy was that the amendment required
generic versions of a patented drug to be manufactured in Canada, and there
were very few manufacturing facilities in Canada. 83 In 1969, the
government eliminated this requirement and permitted drug import
licensing.84 This new policy resulted in the development of a strong generic
industry in Canada.
85
However, a negative result of the policy was that pharmaceutical
companies in Canada decreased their investment in the research and
86development of new drugs. In 1987, in an attempt to balance the interests
of generic drug companies and the brand-name pharmaceutical companies,
87Parliament passed Bill C-22, amending the compulsory licensing regime.
Under Bill C-22, compulsory licensing was still mandated, but only after the
first seven years of patent protection had expired. 88 This encouraged
research and development by giving the pharmaceutical companies a period
77 Lexchin, supra note 73, at 70.
78 id.
79 id.
80 Carter, supra note 16, at 241.
S Lexchin, supra note 73, at 70.
62 id.
83 id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
16 Carter, supra note 16, at 242.
87 Id.
88 id.
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of exclusivity in the market, thus enabling them to recover their investments
in research and development.
8 9
In order to balance the new period of exclusivity granted to the
pharmaceutical companies, another provision of Bill C-22 established the
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board ("PMPRB") to monitor and control
patented drug prices. 90 In 1993, in response to the North American Free
Trade Agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico,
Parliament passed Bill C-91 eliminating compulsory licensing. 9'
B. Regulation of the Safety and Efficacy of Pharmaceuticals-The Food
and Drugs Act
92
In 1963, Canada enacted major changes in the Canadian Food and
Drugs Act. 93  The changes, using language very similar to the 1962
amendments to the United States' Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
required manufacturers to submit "substantial evidence" that a new drug was
both safe and effective before market entry would be allowed.94 Canada's
administrative body, the Therapeutics Products Directorate (counterpart to
the United States FDA), employed a regulatory process for market entry of
new drugs very similar to that used by the FDA. 95 The Canadian drug
approval process had similar implications for patent protection as in the
United States: pioneer drugs lost effective patent term while in the
regulatory process, but had de facto patent term extension because the
generic drug company could not begin the regulatory process until the patent
term expired.
C. 1993 Waxman-Hatch- Type Amendments to the Patent Act
In 1993, in addition to elimination of the compulsory licensing
system, changes were made to the Patent Act and to the corresponding
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) ("NOC") Regulations which
enabled the entrance of generic drugs into the market as soon as the patent
'9 Id. at 242-43.
90 Lexchin, supra note 73, at 73.
91 Carter, supra note 16, at 243.
92 R.S.C., ch. F-27, §§ 1-37 (2001) (Can.).
93 Carter, supra note 16, at 220.
94 id.
9' Id. at 23 1.
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on the pioneer drug expired.96 The changes were very similar to the changes
in the drug approval process enacted by the United States in the 1984 Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. 97 The NOC
Regulations generally allow a generic drug manufacturer to make reference
to another approved drug to demonstrate bioequivalence.98 If and when it is
determined that the generic drug is both safe and effective, the Minister of
National Health and Welfare will issue a notice of compliance permitting the
drug to enter the market. 99 However, the generic manufacturer must certify
that the patent on the referenced drug has expired or is invalid, or that the
actions of the generic manufacturer will not infringe the patent. 00 If the
generic manufacturer certifies that a patent is invalid or will not be infringed,
it must give notice to the patent holder.'0 l The patent holder has forty-five
days in which to seek an injunction preventing the issuance of a notice of
compliance.' 0 2 Approval of the drug can be withheld for up to twenty-four
months'0 3 or until a court decision has been rendered.
10 4
As in the United States, Canada enacted a Roche-Bolar-type safe
harbor amendment to allow generic manufacturers to make and use the
patented product during the regulatory process without infringing the patent:
"It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use
or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information required under any law of
Canada.... ,,l5
The Canadian Patent Act included an additional provision that is not
available in the United States:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes,
constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1) to make, construct or use the invention, during
the applicable period provided for by the regulations, for the
96 Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Minister of National Health and Welfare, [1996] 67 C.P.R. (3d) 484,
487.
97 The U.S. drug approval process is codified in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C.S. § 3550) (1997).
98 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 93-133, § 5(1) (2001) (Can.).
99 Carter, supra note 16, at 233.
:Go SOR93-133, § 5(1)(b)(ii-iv).
"o' SOR93-133, § 5(3).
192 SOR93-133, § 6(1).
903 SOR 93-133, § 7(l)(e).
lO SOR 93-133, § 7(2)(b).
105 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(1) (2001) (Can.).
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manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after the
date on which the term of the patent expires.'
6
This provision of the Patent Act was implemented in the Manufacturing and
Storage of Patented Medicines Regulations that permitted the manufacture
and stockpiling of the generic drug for the "six month period immediately
preceding the date on which the term of the patent expires." 107 This
provision sanctioned activities that, in the United States, the court in Biogen
held to be non-exempt under the safe harbor provision. '08 However,
Canada's stockpiling provision was repealed in 2000 in response to a
decision by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") that found the
stockpiling of a generic drug while the patent was still in effect to be a
violation of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. 109
The 1993 amendments to the Patent Act provided many advantages to
the generic industry by allowing the generic manufacturer to reference the
clinical data previously submitted by the pioneer drug company and to
benefit from a safe harbor provision against charges of infringement.
However, unlike in the United States, the Patent Act contains no provision
for the restoration of patent term lost by the pharmaceutical company while
the drug is in the regulatory process and not on the market.l"0
1. Litigation of the Notice of Compliance Regulations
While there has been litigation in the United States regarding what
activities are entitled to the benefit of the safe harbor provision, there has
been little if any litigation in Canada over this issue. This is in spite of the
fact that both statutes use almost identical language: it is not infringement to
make, use or sell a patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information" to a regulatory body. The
litigation in Canada instead has centered on the issuance of the notice of
compliance, and has been further complicated by compulsory licenses that
are still in effect.
'0o R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(2).
107 Manufacturing and Storage of Patented Medicines Regulations, SOR 93-134, § 1 (2001) (Can.).
108 Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996). See supra notes 69-70 and
accornpanying text.
I Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 2000-373, § 1 (2001) (Can.). For a
discussion of the World Trade Organization decision, see infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
110 Lexchin, supra note 73, at 76.
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Under the regulations, "' when a party applies for a notice of
compliance, they must allege that the patent has expired, the patent is not
valid, or that "no claim for the medicine itself and no claim for the use of the
medicine would be infringed by the making, constructing, using or selling by
that person of the drug for which the submission for the notice of
compliance is filed." 112 When a party makes an allegation of non-
infringement, the party shall "provide a detailed statement of the legal and
factual basis for the allegation."" 3 The patent owner then "may, within 45
days after being served with a notice of an allegation... apply to a court for
an order prohibiting the Minister from issuing a notice of compliance until
after the expiration of a patent that is the subject of allegation."' 14 Subject to
some conditions, "the Minister shall not issue a notice of compliance...
[before] the court has declared that the patent is not valid or that no claim for
the medicine itself and no claim for the use of the medicine would be
infringed."'"
Some of the issues spawning litigation included whether the
application for an injunctive order begins an action for infringement," 6
which party has the burden of proof in establishing whether or not the patent
would be infringed, "17 and how detailed the statement of the legal and
factual basis for the allegation must be." 
8
In 1994, the Federal Court of Appeals, in David Bull Laboratories
(Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., ruled that an application to a court for an
order prohibiting the Minister from issuing a notice of compliance does not
constitute an action for infringement. 19 The court expressed confusion as to
why the draftsperson in SOR 93-133, § 7 used language indicating that a
court would decide if the patent is valid or infringed. 120 The court
emphasized that the regulations do not "create or abolish any rights of action
11 The regulatory language is important to the outcome of the cases, and is thus cited extensively.
112 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 93-133, § 5(1) (200 1) (Can.).
' SOR93-133, § 5(3)(a).
114 SOR93-133, § 6(1).
"' SOR93-133, §§ 7(1), 7(2)(b).
116 David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588, 599.
17 Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1996] 65 C.P.R. (3d) 499, 505.
"' Id. at 504.
"9 David Bull Laboratories, I F.C. at 599 ("[T]hese proceedings are not actions for determining
validity or infringement: rather they are proceedings to determine whether the Minister may issue a notice
of compliance. That decision must turn on whether there are allegations by the generic company
sufficiently substantiated to support a conclusion for administrative purposes (the issue of a notice of
compliance) that the applicant's patent would not be infringed if the generic's product is put on the
market.").
"0 Id. at 599 (citing Merck Frosst Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare),
[1994] 55 C.P.R. (3d) 302, 319-20).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
between the parties," 121 and that the "summary procedure of a judicial
review application" is not the appropriate forum for litigating validity and
infringement issues. 1
22
In 1996, the court in Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., ruled
that when a patent owner applies for a court order prohibiting the issuance of
a notice of compliance, the regulatory scheme places the burden on the
patent owner to disprove the generic manufacturer's non-infringement
allegation. 23 However, the findings in Syntex regarding the burden of proof
are no longer valid. In 1998, the federal government changed the
regulations, shifting the burden of proof from the patent owner to the generic
manufacturer. 124 It is no longer presumed that the allegation of non-
infringement is true; instead, it is now presumed that the patent will be
infringed. 25 The Syntex court also found that the generic manufacturer must
do more than simply state that their product will not infringe the patent on
the brand-name drug: "[T]here is an evidential burden paced on the [generic
manufacturer] requiring it to advance facts which, if assumed or proven, can
justify the allegation [of non-infringement]. ''126
In another case, Faulding (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia S.P.A., 127 the
court, as in the United States Intermedics case, 128 applied an objective
standard when deciding whether or not the generic manufacturer, Faulding,
had infringed the Pharmacia patent. Pharmacia counterclaimed charging
that Faulding intended in the future to infringe the Pharmacia patent by
making and/or importing the drug into Canada and selling the drug in
Canada.129 The court ruled that while the new drug submission was under
review by the Minister, Faulding was entitled to the safe harbor protection of
section 55.2(1) of the Patent Act.' 30 The court also noted that "claims for
infringement that are premised on indefinite acts in the future are in the
realm of speculation. As such they are premature and will be struck out.'
3 1
However, the court noted that if and when Faulding attained a notice of
compliance, if it then commenced to market the drug while the Pharmacia
.23 Id. at 599.
112 Id. at 600.
123 Syntex, (USA) Inc. v. Novopahrm Ltd., [1996] 65 C.P.R. (3d) 499, 506.
124 Wayne Kondro, Canadian Hopes for Low-Cost Drugs Dashed, THE LANCET 350 (Jan. 31, 1998).
325 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 93-133, § 6(6) (2001) (Can.).
326 Syntex, 65 C.P.R. (3d) at 505.
327 [1998] 82 C.P.R. (3d) 435.
328 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See supra notes 47, 53
and accompanying text.
329 Faulding, 82 C.P.R. (3d) at 439.
'3o Id.
131 Id. (citation omitted).
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patent was still in effect, Pharmacia would be free to bring an infringement
action.'
32
The Canadian courts have expressed frustration with the amount of
litigation that the regulations have spawned. 33 The courts find it difficult to
protect private intellectual property rights provided by the Patent Act in light
of the regulatory scheme enacted to provide for the public safety. 134
Furthermore, the courts have been frustrated because the regulations have
not established a clear procedure to be followed when a patent holder
challenges the notice of allegation.'
35
This type of litigation has been avoided in the United States. Perhaps
this is because the United States statute clearly provides for an infringement
action: "If the applicant made a certification [that the patent is invalid or has
been infringed], the approval shall be made effective immediately unless an
action is brought for infringement of a patent which is the subject of the
certification. ,,136
This difference between the United States and Canadian law is
significant because of the length of time required to adjudicate an
infringement action as opposed to a summary proceeding. The sooner a
court action for a stay of a notice of compliance is completed, the sooner the
generic drug can enter the market (assuming the generic manufacturer is
successful in preventing the issuance of a stay). An infringement action
decided on the merits, however, wil! presumably take much longer to
adjudicate. Thus, the probability is high that in the United States a pioneer
drug company could delay approval of the generic drug, keeping it off the
market, for up to the full thirty months allowed by law.
2. Canadian Law, Though Still Favoring the Generic Manufacturer, Has
Become More Balanced
Early Canadian patent law governing pharmaceuticals, with its
compulsory licensing system, clearly favored generic manufacturers.
Abolishment of the compulsory licensing system provided a huge benefit to
the brand-name pharmaceutical industry. However, as a trade-off, the
132 Id.
133 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Minister of National Health and Welfare, [1996] 67 C.P.R. (3d) 484,
492 ("Appropriate refinements [of the Regulations] were needed from the beginning. The quantity of
litigation, which has ensued from the lacuna in the Regulations, and its attendant cost for the respective
pharmaceutical companies, and for the Court, is most disconcerting.").
' Id. at 491.
135 id.
136 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (1997).
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government established the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board to
control the price of patented drugs. Furthermore, Canada, unlike the United
States, has no provisions for restoring patent term lost by the pioneer drug
company while its product is in the regulatory process.
Although compulsory licensing has been abolished, there are still
provisions in the law to support the generic drug industry. For instance, there
is no counterpart agency to the PMPRB to monitor and control the price of
generic drugs. In addition, the generic manufacturer can use the data of the
pioneer drug manufacturer to hasten entry into the market and is also
protected from infringement actions during the regulatory process by the
safe harbor provision.
Although the law remains tilted in favor of the generic manufacturer,
the Canadian government has made great strides in creating a more balanced
system of patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions.
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA "')
In 1992, the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 137 NAFTA requires a
minimum patent term of "at least 20 years from the date of filing or 17 years
from the date of grant."' 38 NAFTA also allows, but does not require, the
restoration of patent term lost during a regulatory process. 139 NAFTA
requires patent protection for pharmaceuticals,1 40 requires the same term of
protection for all patented inventions, 41 and severely restricts compulsory
licensing. 142
1. Effect of NAFTA in the United States
NAFTA has had little impact on patent protection for pharmaceuticals
in the United States. The United States, at the time of the signing of
NAFTA, had a seventeen-year from date of issue patent term and also had
"' North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
38 Id. art. 1709, § 12, at 674.
13 Id.
141 Id. art. 1709, § 7, at 673.
141 Id.
42 Id. art. 1709, § 10, at 674.
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provisions for restoration of patent term lost due to regulatory procedures.
143
Furthermore, the United States did not have a compulsory licensing regime.
2. Effect of NAFTA in Canada
NAFTA had a much greater impact on the pharmaceutical industry in
Canada. In anticipation of the signing of NAFTA, Parliament passed Bill
C-91 in 1993.144 Bill C-91 abolished the compulsory licensing system and
extended the patent term for pharmaceuticals from seventeen years from
date of issue to twenty years from date of filing. 45 However, to balance the
added protection given to pharmaceuticals, the bill strengthened the Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board. 1
46
As could be expected, the end of compulsory licensing engendered
much litigation. While no new licenses were issued, licenses in effect at the
time of the legislation were allowed to continue. The Canadian Supreme
Court addressed some of the issues surrounding residual compulsory
licenses in two companion cases handed down on the same day, July 9,
1998: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.147 and Merck Frosst Canada, Inc.
v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare).
148
The cases involved an agreement made between Apotex and
Novopharm, two major generic drug companies in Canada. Apotex and
Novopharm each held compulsory licenses issued to them before the
passage of Bill C-9 1.149 In anticipation of the passage of the bill, they
entered into an agreement to "share their rights under licences for any
product for which only one of the parties may hold a useable licence."'
50
The agreement further provided that "the licensed party shall supply material
to the unlicensed party from the licensed party's source at a price equal to
the fair market price of the material together with such royalties as shall be
payable under the terms of the licence."5 This agreement was the subject
at issue in these both cases.
143 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 156 (2000).
14 Carter, supra note 16, at 243.
145 Id.
146 id. at 245.
141 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129. This opinion was issued on a combined appeal of two cases: Eli Lilly and
Co. v. Novopharm, [1996] 67 C.P.R. (3d) 377, and Eli Lilly and Co. v. Apotex, [1996] 66 C.P.R. (3d) 329.148 [1998] 2 S.C.R1 193.
49 Eli Lilly, 2 S.C.R. at 141.
ISo Id. at 141.
's' Id. at 142.
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In Eli Lilly, Novopharm held a compulsory license from Eli Lilly that
was non-transferable and prohibited the granting of sublicenses. 152 The
license also gave Eli Lilly the option to terminate the license if its terms
were breached. 153 In 1993 Apotex applied for a notice of compliance and
filed a notice of allegation that it would not infringe the Eli Lilly patent
because of its agreement with licensee Novopharm. 154 Novopharm also
began efforts to obtain a notice of compliance, alleging that it would not
infringe Eli Lilly's patent because of its license. 155 Eli Lilly argued that the
license was no longer valid because Novopharm breached its terms upon
entry into the agreement with Apotex, 156 and, therefore, both Apotex and
Novopharm would infringe the patent. Disposition of both cases turned on
whether the agreement between Apotex and Novopharm was a sublicense or
a supply agreement.
In the infringement cases brought by Eli Lilly against Novopharm and
Apotex, the federal appellate courts had found the agreement to be a
sublicense. 157 In Eli Lilly, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
sublicense versus purchase and sale agreement at some length. 58 The Court
found that despite terms of the agreement between Apotex and Novopharm
that they would "share rights," in actuality no rights were transferred. 159
"The agreement does not grant Apotex the right to do independently of
Novopharm anything which only Novopharm is licensed to do."' 160 The
Court found the agreement not to be a sublicense, but a supply agreement.'16
Although the Court emphasized that its decision was confined to the facts of
the case,'62 its very detailed discussion of the issue serves as guidance as to
how the issue should be analyzed in future controversies.
In Merck Frosst, the issue again was whether Novopharm had
breached the terms of a licensing agreement it had with Kyorin
Pharmaceutical Co. when it entered into the supply agreement with
Apotex. 163 In that case, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Eli Lilly that the
152 Id. at 139-41.
s Id. at 140.
I d. at 145.
1 Id. at 146.
156 id.
I5 d. at 148, 149.
Is d. at 161-80.
"9 Id. at 178.
160 id.
161 id.
'62 Id. at 179.
163 Merck Frosst, 2 S.C.R. at 193, 197. Novopharm had a licensing agreement to sell the patented
drug outside of Canada, whereas Merck Frosst was the exclusive licensee for sale of the patented drug in
Canada until July 2, 1993. Id. at 199. After that date, Novopharm's licensing agreement permitted it to
VOL. I1I No. I
JANUARY 2002 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN THE US. AND CANADA 201
Novopharm-Apotex agreement was not a sublicense and therefore
Novopharm had not breached the agreement.164 However, in Merck Frosst
the Court also addressed the issue of when a court should assess whether or
not an allegation of non-infringement is a valid statement. 65 Because of the
complexities of the notice of compliance regulations and the former
regulations governing compulsory licensing, the possibility exists that when
a notice of allegation is made, it may not be technically true that the party
will not be infringing a patent if the notice of compliance were to be granted
on that date or on the forty-sixth day after the filing of the notice of
compliance (the patent owner having forty-five days to apply to a court for a
stay). 166
The Merck Frosst court was also concerned with the provisions in the
regulations prohibiting the Minister from awarding a notice of compliance
for a period of thirty months 167 from the day it is notified that the patent
owner has filed an application for a stay with the court, or until the court
decides the merits of the application. 68 The Court stated that "it would be
manifestly unjust to subject generic drug producers to such a draconian
regime without at least permitting them to protect themselves and reduce the
length of the presumptive injunction by initiating the NOC process as early
as possible.' Consequently, the Court found that the proper time to decide
the validity of the notice of allegation was the hearing date on the
application for a stay.170
B. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")/Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS")
Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the
GATT/TRIPS agreement of 1993.' 7' GATT/TRIPS provides that "patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
produce and sell the drug in Canada. Id. Apotex filed for a notice of compliance based on its supply
agreement with Novopharm. Id. at 198-99.
6 Id. at 208.
165 Id. at 209.
'66 Id. at 212-13.
167 Id. at 214-15. This period has been reduced to twenty-four months. See Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 93-133, § 7(e) (2001) (Can.).
161 Merck Frosst, 2 S.C.R. at 214.
169 Id.
"7 Id. at 215.
171 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
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fields of technology."' 7 2 Exceptions were provided for some inventions, but
the language appears to require patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
173
GATT/TRIPS allows for "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent," 174 and for limited compulsory licensing. 171
Furthermore, the agreement establishes the patent term as twenty years from
the date of filing. 
176
1. Effect of GA TT/TRIPS in the United States
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
17 7
("URAA") to implement GATT. As a result, 35 U.S.C. § 154 was amended
to provide for patent term protection of twenty years from the date of
filing. 178 However, the change in patent term was complicated by the
existence of the previous term of seventeen years from the date of issue, and
by extensions granted to restore patent term lost during the FDA regulatory
process.
Under the URAA, patents in effect or applied for during the six-month
period after the enactment of the URAA would have a patent term that is the
greater of twenty years from filing or seventeen years from issue, 179
extending the patent term for some inventions. This provision may create a
situation where a competing product of a patented invention was on the
market and not infringing because the patent had expired during the Delta
period, 80 but, by virtue of the URAA patent term extension, the competing
product becomes an infringer. The URAA addressed this situation by
providing that the normal remedies for infringement-injunction, damages,
and attorneys fees-would not be available to the patent owner for acts that
became infringing during the Delta period. 181 Instead, the URAA provided
for equitable remuneration for the injured patentee.1 82
It fell to the courts to determine how these provisions applied to the
pharmaeeutical industry in the context of FDA regulations and the ANDA
172 Id. art. 27, at 93.
173 id.
174 Id. art. 30, at 95.
' Id. art. 27, at 93.
176 Id. art. 33, at 96.
177 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
178 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
179 35 U.S.C.S. § 154(c)(1).
IS0 The period of time between the original expiration date and the new expiration date is known as
the "Delta period." DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Company v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397,
1399,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (1995).
' 35 U.S.C.S. § 154(c)(2).
12 35 U.S.C.S. § 154(c)(3).
VOL. I I No. I
JANUARY 2002 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN THE US. AND CANADA 203
process for generic drugs. For example, an ANDA application which
certified the date the reference patent would expire could be invalidated
because of the patent term extension granted under URAA.
In regulations implementing URAA, the FDA "required ANDA
applicants who wished to market generic versions of drugs covered by a
patent with a URAA-extended term to file paragraph IV certifications"
1
'
8 3
certifying that the reference patent is "invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted." 184 Filing of a paragraph IV certification would trigger the
application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), which states that "it shall be an act of
infringement [to file an ANDA] if the purpose of such submission is to
obtain approval ... to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of
a drug... claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent."
In DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
DuPont Merck had filed an ANDA in 1993 certifying that the Bristol-Myers
Squibb patent would expire on August 8, 1995.185 However, under the
URAA, the patent term had been extended six months until February 13,
1996.186 DuPont Merck was in an untenable situation because 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii) allowed Bristol-Myers forty-five days from the date of the
filing of the paragraph IV certification to file an infringement action. Filing
of an infringement action delays approval of the ANDA for up to thirty
months,' 8 7 or until the extended patent term expires, effectively preventing
DuPont from marketing its product during the Delta period. 1
88
DuPont sought injunctive relief from the court to compel Bristol-
Myers to waive the forty-five day period and to prevent Bristol-Myers from
filing an infringement action.189 DuPont also claimed the benefit of 35
U.S.C. § 154(c)(2) and (3), maintaining that it had made "substantial
investments" and that as long as it paid Bristol-Myers remunerations, it
would not infringe the patent by making and selling the patented product
during the Delta period.190 The court denied the relief requested, stating:
1. DuPont Merck, 62 F.3d at 1400. Paragraph IV certifications refer to 21 U.S.C.S. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
84 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 355j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2001).
' DuPont Merck, 62 F.3d at 1400.
186 Id. at 1399.
21 U.S.C.S. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
IRS DuPont Merck. 62 F.3d at 1401.
I8 d. at 1400.
190 Id.
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[T]he URAA, by its terms, exempts a qualified infringer from
the remedies of sections 283, 284, and 285 of Title 35. The
URAA, however, works no change on the definition of
infringement under section 271(e)(2) and has no affect on the
statutory provisions relating to FDA approval of ANDAs that
are triggered by that act of infringement.tg9
In another suit involving the same Bristol-Myers Squibb patent, the
defendant Royce Lab filed the required paragraph IV certification, but did
not claim that the patent was invalid or that it would not be infringed;
instead, Royce Lab claimed that it would fall within the safe harbor
provision of the URAA, 35 U.S.C. § 154(c).192 The Royce court also held
that the URAA does not make "infringing activity non-infringing during the
Delta period. It merely provides that infringing conduct will not give rise to
the entire panoply of traditional statutory remedies for patent
infringement."
193
2. Effect of GA TT/TRIPS in Canada
The effect of the GATT agreement on patent protection for
pharmaceuticals in Canada was initially limited because Bill C-91 had
already eliminated compulsory licensing and extended patent term
protection to twenty years from filing. 194 However, Canada has been subject
to actions before the WTO, brought by the European Union and the United
States, alleging that certain provisions of Canada's patent law violate the
GATT/TRIPS agreement.
The European Union brought an action against Canada alleging that
Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) of the Patent Act violated Articles 27.1,195
28.1,196 and 33197 of GATT/TRIPS. 198 Section 55.2 is the Roche-Bolar safe
'9' id. at 1402.192 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Lab, 69 F.3d 1130, 1133, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1995).
'9' Id. at 1136.
194 See supra text accompanying note 145.
'9 GATT, supra note 171, art. 27.1, 33 I.L.M. at 93 ("[P]atent rights [shall be] enjoyable without
discrimination as to the... field of technology").
'" Id. art. 28.1, at 93 (providing that a patent owner shall have the exclusive right "to prevent third
parties not having his consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" the
patented invention).
'9' Id. art. 33, at 96 (providing for a patent term of twenty years from date of filing).
198 World Trade Organization ("WTO"), Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products-
Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States-Report of the Panel, Document No.
00-1012, WT/DS114/R, § 7.11 (2000), http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp [hereinafter WTO,
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products].
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harbor provision that allows generic manufacturers to "make, use, or sell the
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information required under any law of Canada,"' 99 and also
allows for the manufacture and storage of generic drugs in preparation for
200market entry before the patent has expired.
The European Union argued that Canada discriminated against the
pharmaceutical patent holder by allowing acts of infringement that are not
permitted against other types of inventions. 20 1 Canada claimed a defense
under Article 30 of GATT/TRIPS:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties.
20 2
The WTO panel agreed with Canada that the safe harbor provision of
the Patent Act § 55.2(1) falls within the "limited exceptions" of Article
30. 3 However, the panel found that the manufacture and storage provision
of § 55.2(2) violated GATT.204 Canada subsequently repealed this provision
in 2000.205
The U.S. action against Canada alleged that Section 45 of Canada's
Patent Act violated Articles 33206 and 70207 of GATT/TRIPS. 20 8 Canada's
Patent Act provides for two different patent terms: for patents issued on
applications filed on or after October 1, 1989, the term is twenty years from
the date of filing; 209 for patents issued on applications filed before 1989, the
199 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(1) (2001) (Can.).
20 R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(2).
201 WTO, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 198, at § 4.5.
202 Id. § 7.12.
203 Id. § 7.50.
204 Id. § 7.38.
205 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR 2000-373, § 1 (2001) (Can.).
206 GATT, supra note 171, art. 33, 33 I.L.M. at 96 (providing for a patent term of twenty years from
filing).
207 Id. art. 70, at 109 (providing that the terms of GATT/TRIPS shall apply to "all subject matter
existing at the date of application of the Agreement... and which is protected.., on the said date").
205 WTO, Canada-Term of Patent Protection-Report of the Panel, Document No. 00-1695,
WT/DS170/R, § 2.1 (2000), http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter WTO, Canada-Term of Patent Protection].
209 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P4, § 44 (2001) (Can.).
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term is seventeen years from the issue date.210 The United States argued that
Canada should be required to bring the term for patents applied for before
1989 into compliance with the GATT/TRIPS twenty-years-from-filing
term. 2 11 The WTO panel agreed and found Canada in violation of the
212GATT/TRIPS agreement. Canada is not yet in compliance on this issue.
C. International Agreements Have Brought Uniformity to the Patent
Laws of Canada and the United States
As a result of NAFTA and GATT/TRIPS, patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions has approached uniformity in the United States
and Canada. Canada abolished its compulsory licensing system; both
countries have a patent term of twenty years from the date of filing; and
patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions is virtually guaranteed by the
treaties. Despite some remaining differences, such as price controls in
Canada and Canada's decision not to restore patent term lost during the
regulatory process, international treaties have given the pharmaceutical
industry strong patent protection in both countries. In spite of political
.pressures in both countries to reduce the price of drugs, strong patent
protection is likely to remain given that NAFTA and GATT/TRIPS are
multi-national agreements which would take many years to
renegotiate.Major changes in the patent laws of either country would be
difficult to achieve without violating the agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the United States and Canada share a common political
heritage, both with roots in the English system, the two countries have
fundamental differences regarding the government's role in the health care
industry. The success of each government in meeting its obligations to
balance competing public interests, to protect intellectual property rights, to
encourage research and development, to maximize access to new drugs, and
to ensure the safety and efficacy of drugs should be judged in light of the
political and economic realities in each country.
As the Canadian government modified and eventually abolished the
compulsory licensing system, it had two goals: to develop a strong generic
drug industry and to increase expenditures on research and development.
210 R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 45.
211 WTO, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, supra note 208, § 3.1.
212 Id. § 7.1.
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There is evidence that it has been successful in accomplishing both goals-
of the top drug manufacturers in Canada, two generic firms ranked sixth and
sixteenth in sale in 1999.213 Furthermore, expenditures on research and
development by pharmaceutical companies increased from 6.5% of revenues
in 1988 to 11.3% in 1999.214 Although patent protection for pharmaceuticals
is not as strong in Canada as it is in the United States, the pharmaceutical
industry is thriving in Canada, as evidenced by the fact that patented
medicines accounted for 61% of all drugs sold in 1999.215
In the United States, one of the goals of the Waxman-Hatch Act was
to contain the cost of drugs by promoting a strong generic drug industry. It
appears the Act has been successful as evidenced by the fact that sales of
generic drugs in the United States as a percentage of prescription volume has
increased from 18.6% in 1984, the year the Act was passed, to 47.1% in
1999.216
Although problems remain, both governments have been successful in
creating a balanced system that promotes both a strong pharmaceutical
industry and a strong generic drug industry. Creative solutions must be
found to make new drug discoveries affordable and accessible. However,
both governments should maintain a strong commitment to protecting the
intellectual property rights of the companies that make the new discoveries
in order to ensure the continued production of new medicines.
21 Sales of Drugs in Canada, in 1999 PATENTED MEDICINES PRICES REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL
REPORT 16 n.2 (1999), http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/06-e/06ann99e.htim.
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PRICES REVIEW BOARD, supra note 213, at 37 tbi.6.
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